

The background features a series of overlapping, concentric circles in light gray and white, some solid and some dashed. A large, vibrant blue oval is centered on the page, containing the main title and author information. A thick, black, curved shape is positioned behind the blue oval on the left side, resembling a stylized 'C' or a partial circle.

Security Concerns and Vulnerabilities in Blockchain Systems

Prof. Gordon Pace
Malta Digital Innovation Authority
September 2019

Security Concerns and Vulnerabilities in Blockchain Systems

- **Security concerns at the blockchain layer:**
 - blockchain node bugs
 - consensus algorithms and vulnerabilities (50%+1 attack, forking, rejected blocks).
- **Security concerns at the smart contract logic layer:**
 - bugs and vulnerabilities in the smart contract logic;
 - malicious code;
 - vulnerabilities at the blockchain level (e.g. transaction ordering)
- **Security concerns at the edge of the blockchain:**
 - traditional vulnerabilities through off-chain access of blockchain and smart contract
 - human factors in security concerns.

Security Concerns and Vulnerabilities in Blockchain Systems

- **Security concerns**

- blockchains
- consensus

Undesirable human behaviour
using expected application functionality

(e.g. double-spending, orphaned blocks).

- **Security concerns**

- bugs and
- malicious
- vulnerabilities

vs.

Undesirable human behaviour
due to unexpected application functionality

- **Security concerns**

- traditional vulnerabilities through off-chain access of blockchain and smart contract
- human factors in security concerns.

Security Concerns and Vulnerabilities in Blockchain Systems

- **Security concerns**

- blockchains
- consensus

~~Undesirable human behaviour
using expected application functionality~~

(orphaned blocks).

- **Security concerns**


- bugs and
- malicious
- vulnerabilities

vs.


**Undesirable human behaviour
due to unexpected application functionality**

- **Security concerns**

- traditional vulnerabilities through off-chain access of blockchain and smart contract
- human factors in security concerns.



Traditional systems



Vulnerabilities in system software

Bugs or vulnerabilities in scripts

Bugs or vulnerabilities in frontend

Bugs or vulnerabilities in device

Backend database and underlying systems

Backend scripts

Frontend


Browser and device systems




Spoofing frontend to change user activity

Human security weaknesses


Traditional systems vulnerabilities




Traditional systems



Decentralised systems










Decentralised systems





DLT code
handling
native
transactions
and smart contract
execution


Smart
contracts





















Traditional Vulnerabilities

1. Human weaknesses

- Passwords/keys 'on a post-it note'
- Phishing
- Social engineering
- Rubber-hose cryptanalysis




Responsibility: Users.

Traditional Vulnerabilities

2. Platform vulnerabilities

- Due to bugs on the device/browser/operating system/platform.
- Regular updates required to be carried out




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Traditional Vulnerabilities


3. Front-end vulnerabilities

- The responsibility of the developers (of the front end), not the users.
- Traditional security measures.
- Handled through code analysis, penetration testing, etc.

Responsibility: Developers of front-end.



Blockchain-Side Vulnerabilities



Sender

Receiver




Sender

Receiver



Blockchain-side



Sender

Receiver



Blockchain-side

Memory pool of transactions

transaction 1

transaction 2

...

transaction n

Sender

Receiver



Blockchain-side

Memory pool of transactions

transaction 1

transaction 2

...

transaction n

Previous blockchain transactions

15 **Block 0**

transaction 1 of block 0

transaction 2 of block 0

...

transaction 12 of block 0

block reward

31 **Block 1**

transaction 1 of block 1

transaction 2 of block 1

...

transaction 17 of block 1

block reward

9 **Block 2**

transaction 1 of block 2

transaction 2 of block 2

...

transaction 4 of block 2

block reward

...

44 **Block 234**

transaction 1 of block 234

transaction 2 of block 234

...

transaction 13 of block 234

block reward



Sender

Receiver

Anatomy of a block



Block number



Blockchain-side

Memory pool of transactions

transaction 1

transaction 2

...

transaction n

transaction n+1

Previous blockchain

15 Block 0

transaction 1 of block 0

transaction 2 of block 0

...

transaction 12 of block 0

block reward

31 Block 1

transaction 1 of block 1

transaction 2 of block 1

...

block reward

44 Block 234

transaction 1 of block 234

transaction 2 of block 234

...

transaction 13 of block 234

block reward

Sender

Receiver

Anatomy of a block



Block number

23 **Block 74**

A number of transactions each signed by the sender

Blockchain-side

Memory pool of transactions

- transaction 1
- transaction 2
- ...
- transaction n
- transaction $n+1$


Previous blockchain

- 15 **Block 0**
- transaction 1 of block 0
- transaction 2 of block 0
- ...
- transaction 12 of block 0
- block reward

- transaction 1 of block 74
- transaction 2 of block 74
- ...
- transaction 29 of block 74
- block reward

- 44 **Block 234**
- transaction 1 of block 234
- transaction 2 of block 234
- ...

Block reward for miner who added the block



Sender

Receiver

Anatomy of a block



Block number

23 **Block 74**

A number of transactions each signed by the sender

Blockchain-side

Memory pool of transactions

transaction 1

transaction 2

...

transaction *n*

transaction *n+1*

Previous blockchain

15 **Block 0**

transaction 1 of block 0

transaction 2 of block 0

...

transaction 12 of block 0

block reward

transaction 1 of block 74

transaction 2 of block 74

...

transaction 29 of block 74

block reward

44 **Block 234**

transaction 1 of block 234

transaction 2 of block 234

...

Block reward for miner who added the block

The *hash* of the previous block (including the hash written there)



Sender

Receiver

Anatomy of a block




Block number

A number of transactions each signed by the sender

A **nonce** - an **arbitrary** value chosen by the miner such that the hash of the block is less than some constant value

Block reward for miner who added the block

The *hash* of the previous block (including the hash written there)



Sender

Receiver



Blockchain-side

Memory pool of transactions

transaction 1

transaction 2

...

transaction n

Previous blockchain transactions

15 **Block 0**

transaction 1 of block 0

transaction 2 of block 0

...

transaction 12 of block 0

block reward

31 **Block 1**

transaction 1 of block 1

transaction 2 of block 1

...

transaction 17 of block 1

block reward

9 **Block 2**

transaction 1 of block 2

transaction 2 of block 2

...

transaction 4 of block 2

block reward

...

44 **Block 234**

transaction 1 of block 234

transaction 2 of block 234

...

transaction 13 of block 234

block reward



Sender



Receiver



Blockchain-side

Memory pool of transactions

transaction 1

transaction 2

...

transaction n

transaction $n+1$

Previous blockchain transactions



...



Miner



Blockchain-side

Memory pool of transactions

transaction 1

transaction 2

...

transaction n

transaction $n+1$

Previous blockchain transactions



...




Miner




1. Choose some pending transactions.

Blockchain-side



Previous blockchain transactions




Miner




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
Blockchain-side



Previous blockchain transactions




Miner




1. Choose some pending transactions.
2. Put them in a new block.

Blockchain-side



Previous blockchain transactions



Miner




hash of
block 234




1. Choose some pending transactions.
2. Put them in a new block.
3. Find a nonce such that hash of the block is less than N.


Blockchain-side



Previous blockchain transactions



Miner




hash of
block 234



1. Choose some pending transactions.
2. Put them in a new block.
3. Find a nonce such that hash of the block is less than N.
4. Broadcast the solution.

Blockchain-side



Previous blockchain transactions



What if two miners find a solution at the same time?

Some nodes will adopt one solution, others the other.

As soon as one is extended further, that is preferred (longest chain wins).

Blockchain-side


Memory pool of transactions

transaction 1


...


transaction n

Previous blockchain transactions



Blockchain-Side Vulnerabilities






Blockchain-Side Vulnerabilities

4. DLT node vulnerabilities

- DLT node handles communication and protocol to ensure immutability, fairness, etc.
- Such vulnerabilities can also be due to constituent parts e.g. libraries used.
- (Surprisingly) rare instances.

Responsibility: DLT developers.




Blockchain-Side Vulnerabilities

5. Consensus algorithm vulnerabilities

- Selfish mining by not sharing found blocks immediately.
- Network attacks aiming at disrupting or manipulating connectivity between nodes at connection time or later on.
- DDOS attacks disrupting miner activity by flooding with micro-transactions or the memory pool of transactions.
- 51% attack aiming at taking over the network.


Responsibility: Consensus protocol designers.



Blockchain-Side Vulnerabilities

51% attacks


- Power to prevent transactions from taking place.
- Power to 'reverse' transactions – double spending.
- Power to fork the network.
- Power to prevent others from finding blocks.



Blockchain-Side Vulnerabilities

51% attacks

- It's even worse than it sounds:
 - Owning 51% for a short period of time suffices for many attacks.
 - Hash power can be rented.
 - Some attacks have high chance of success even with less than 50% of network computational power.




Blockchain-Side Vulnerabilities

6. Smart contract vulnerabilities

- Bugs and deviations from intended functionality.
- Platform or programming language vulnerabilities.
- Malicious code.


Responsibility: Designers and developers of smart contracts.



Blockchain-Side Vulnerabilities

Smart contract vulnerabilities

Bugs and deviations from intended functionality.




Blockchain-Side Vulnerabilities

Smart contract vulnerabilities

Bugs and deviations from intended functionality.

Have you ever used software that worked perfectly?




Blockchain-Side Vulnerabilities

Smart contract vulnerabilities

Bugs and deviations from intended functionality.

Have you ever used software that worked perfectly? Even worse...

Critical nature of smart contracts should require experienced software engineers using robust engineering practices...



Blockchain-Side Vulnerabilities

Smart contract vulnerabilities

Bugs and deviations from intended functionality.

Have you ever used software that worked perfectly? Even worse...

Critical nature of smart contracts should require experienced software engineers using robust engineering practices...

But small size of smart contracts means many are developed by inexperienced programmers.

Vulnerabilities in DLT node software

Bugs or vulnerabilities

DLT do not handle native transactions and smart contract execution

Consensus algorithm vulnerabilities



The Vulnerabilities

Vulnerabilities

arise from intended

software that worked

...

Smart contracts should

involve software engineers

and good coding practices...

Due to the small size of smart contracts means many are developed by inexperienced programmers.

Vulnerabilities in DLT node software

Bugs or vulnerabilities

The Vulnerabilities

nerabilities

as intended

DLT of handling native transactions and smart contract execution



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Consensus algorithm vulnerabilities

many are developed by inexperienced programmers.

Vulnerabilities
in DLT node
software

Bugs or
vulnerabilities

The Vulnerabilities

Market Cap: \$273.47B 24h Reported Vol: \$50.91B Trusted Vol: \$2.77B BTC Dominance: 71.2% Cryptocurrencies: 2,332

CRYPTOSLATE SIGN UP TRENDING NEWS COINS DIRECTORY PLACES RESEARCH

EOS

EOS DApp Smart Contract Exploit Pays Out \$200K to Hacker

Sam Town · Sep 16, 2018 · 1 min read

Smart contract weaknesses in EOS-based gambling dApp EOBet have allowed hackers to manipulate the outcome of blockchain dice rolls, capturing 126,000 EOS in just 36 hours.


An **official announcement** from EOSBet explains the manner in which the attack was executed—by exploiting a flaw in smart contract code, the hacker was able to place bets without transferring EOS to the contract, while still capturing payouts from successful predictions.

DLT of
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
many
programmers.



Blockchain-Side Vulnerabilities

Smart contract vulnerabilities

Platform or programming language vulnerabilities.




Blockchain-Side Vulnerabilities

Smart contract vulnerabilities

Platform or programming language vulnerabilities.

The tools should deter, not foster mistakes.



Blockchain-Side Vulnerabilities

Smart contract vulnerabilities

Platform or programming language vulnerabilities.

The tools should deter, not foster mistakes.

Alas, few smart contract platforms and programming languages have been developed by the right experts.

Vulnerabilities in DLT node software

Bugs or vulnerabilities

DLT code handling native transactions and smart contract execution

Consensus algorithm

Consensus algorithm vulnerabilities




Blockchain-Side Vulnerabilities

ES
language

foster mistakes.


platforms and
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Blockchain-Side Vulnerabilities

Smart contract vulnerabilities

Malicious code.




Blockchain-Side Vulnerabilities

Smart contract vulnerabilities

Malicious code.

Purposefully introducing obfuscated means of achieving unexpected behavior.




Blockchain-Side Vulnerabilities

Smart contract vulnerabilities

Malicious code.


Purposefully introducing obfuscated means of achieving unexpected behavior.

Treat the developer as an adversary, not an ally.



Blockchain-Side Vulnerabilities

Hybrid Vulnerabilities



Blockchain-Side Vulnerabilities

7. Node software vulnerabilities

- Taking down nodes through known vulnerabilities to perform 51% attack.

Responsibility: DLT developers and miners.

Vulnerabilities
in DLT node
software

Bugs or
vulnerabilities
in smart
contracts


Blockchain-Side Vulnerabilities

Unpatched Ethereum Clients Pose 51% Attack Risk, Says Report

“If a hacker can crash a large number of nodes, controlling 51% of the network becomes easier. Hence, software crashes are a serious security concern for blockchain nodes (unlike in other pieces of software where the hacker does not usually benefit from a crash).”

Consensus
algorithm
vulnerabilities

Responsibility: DLT developers and miners.



Blockchain-Side Vulnerabilities

8. Smart contracts and consensus

- Transaction reordering vulnerabilities.

Responsibility: Smart contract designers.

Vulnerabilities in DLT node software

Bugs or

DLT Vulnerabilities

DLT code handling native transactions and smart contract execution


Contract algorithm vulnerabilities



The crypto world's latest hack sees Bancor lose \$23.5M

Jon Russell @jonrussell / 9:31 am CEST • July 10, 2018

Comment



Bancor, a crypto company that touts a decentralized exchange service, has lost some \$23.5 million of cryptocurrency tokens belonging to its users following a hack.

Responsibility: Smart contract designers.

Vulnerabilities
in DLT node
software

Bugs

The ERC20 standard is quite well-known for building tokens on Ethereum. This standard has a potential frontrunning vulnerability which comes about due to the `approve()` function. A good explanation of this vulnerability can be found [here](#).

The standard specifies the `approve()` function as:

```
function approve(address _spender, uint256 _value) returns (bool success)
```

DLT code
handling
native
transacti
and smart co
executi

This function allows a user to permit other users to transfer tokens on their behalf. The frontrunning vulnerability comes in the scenario when a user, Alice, *approves* her friend, Bob to spend 100 tokens. Alice later decides that she wants to revoke Bob's approval to spend 100 tokens, so she creates a transaction that sets Bob's allocation to 50 tokens. **Bob, who has been carefully watching the chain, sees this transaction and builds a transaction of his own spending the 100 tokens. He puts a higher gasPrice on his transaction than Alice's and gets his transaction prioritised over hers.** Some implementations of `approve()` would allow Bob to transfer his 100 tokens, then when Alice's transaction gets committed, resets Bob's approval to 50 tokens, in effect giving Bob access to 150 tokens. The mitigation strategies of

Con
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Vulnerabilities

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

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

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


Responsibility: Smart contract designers.





And this is but the tip of the iceberg...

- **Various other known attack possibilities over the configurations shown.**
- **And these are but a subset of configurations...**










And this is but the tip of the iceberg...

- **Various other known attack possibilities over the configurations shown.**
- **And these are but a subset of configurations...**
- **So what can we do to address these risks?**

Malta Digital Innovation Authority

Increasing User Trust and Protection in DLTs

- Independent Systems Audit approach being taken by the Malta Digital Innovation Authority.
- DLTs and smart contracts may be registered with the MDIA.



Malta Digital Innovation Authority

Increasing User Trust and Protection in DLTs

- **The MDIA does not evaluate the technology itself, but rather licenses Systems Auditors who can do so.**
- **Their role is to apply due diligence to the technology, ensuring that:**
 - **Appropriate system design and architecture**
 - **Experience and processes in the development team**
 - **Appropriate security measures in place**
 - **Appropriate quality assurance processes**
 - **The software really functions as documented in the blueprint**
 - **Appropriate measures in place as required by the law and MDIA**
 - **Subject matter experts appointed by the SAs sign off each report section, with a concrete opinion about the ITA.**

Malta Digital Innovation Authority

Increasing User Trust and Protection in DLTs

- **Certified Innovative Technology Arrangements provide higher levels of assurance:**
 - **The claimed functionality is documented in the blueprint in English.**
 - **Applicant due diligence will be carried out by MDIA.**
 - **Technical due diligence provided by Systems Auditor's report.**
 - **Identifiable known legal entity (the applicant) who can be held liable.**
 - **Information is stored on a Forensic Node in case investigation is required.**
 - **There is some degree of power-of-intervention which may be requested from a Technical Administrator.**
 - **English description in the blueprint prevails over implementation.**



Malta Digital Innovation Authority

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